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(Panthéon‐Sorbonne)
I. Introduction
The cyclical behavior of (un)employment and wages still poses a for-
midable challenge to macroeconomists. No other aspect of the business
cycle has been as widely studied and remains as poorly understood.
While a consensus has slowly emerged on the importance of search fric-
tions to explain equilibrium unemployment, as well as residual wage
inequality unexplained by observable worker and firm characteristics,
we still do not know how wages are set in practice. When labor de-
mand rises, driven by higher productivity or real demand for goods,
how is it exactly that workers obtain higher wages? And why do wages
rise gradually and slowly over business cycle expansions?
The search‐and‐matching business cycle literature commonly as-
sumes that wages are settled through a bargaining process but does
not identify the source of parties’ bargaining power. The search litera-
ture on wage inequality, invariably cast in steady state and abstracting
from aggregate fluctuations, typically assumes that firms have full
monopsony power and make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers of employment
contracts. To reconcile this intuitive and plausible assumption with the
reality of worker rents and wage inequality and to avoid the Diamond
(1971) paradox, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) identify the source of
workers’bargainingpowerinaformofmoralhazard.Specifically,work-
ers obtain more than their reservation wage in order to be induced to
quit their previous employer and, once hired, to decline future outside
offers. Poaching is the engine of wage growth and differentiation for
individual workers.
In this article we argue that the same poaching mechanism also trans-
mits aggregate productivity shocks to wages and employment. Firms
offer higher wages only when they run out of cheap unemployed job
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tors, who in turn fight back and start paying more to retain their work-
ers. Our argument builds on a set of new facts about aggregate
dynamics in U.S. labor markets over the last two decades that we docu-
ment by drawing in part from newly available data sets. These facts
suggest a new view of how business cycles evolve and mature. We in-
vestigate whether this view is consistent with the transitional dynamics
of the Burdett‐Mortensen equilibrium search model. In Moscarini and
Postel‐Vinay (2008), we develop the first theoretical analysis of the out‐
of‐steady‐statebehavioroftheBurdett‐Mortensen model.
1Inthepresent
paper, we build on those results and present a quantitative simulation
exercise to gauge the extent to which the Burdett‐Mortensen model’s
quantitative predictions are congruent with the facts that we uncover.
The three new facts concern three seemingly unrelated time series.
First, the share of employment at small firms and establishments de-
clines through the 1990s and 2000s expansions and crosses below its
overall average around the middle of each decade; in contrast, large
firms are hit particularly hard by recessions and then slowly recover
employment share. Alternatively, the difference between the growth
rate of employment at large firms/establishments vis‐à‐vis small ones
is strongly procyclical, its troughs and peaks roughly coinciding with
NBER business cycle dates and rising uniformly in between. Second,
the monthly employer‐to‐employer (EE) worker transition rate declines
through the first half of each decade and rebounds starting in 1996 and
in 2004. Large employers poach more than small ones late in the 1990s,
not so after the ensuing recession. Third, various measures of detrended
worker compensation exhibit a behavior quite similar to the EE rate,
both economywide and for each employer size class, with workers at
larger employers earning more at all points in time. All in all, simulta-
neously and at the midpoint of the expansion, several years after the
previous trough, the unemployment rate crosses below trend, large em-
ployers take over net job creation, workers start quitting more from job
to job, and wages accelerate.
These facts suggest the following view of aggregate expansions. Fol-
lowing a positive aggregate shock to labor demand, wages respond lit-
tle on impact and start rising when firms run out of cheap unemployed
hires and start competing to poach and to retain employed workers.
Early in an expansion, the large pool of unemployed workers sustains
firms’ monopsony power. Wages remain low, firms hire mostly from
unemployment, and relatively few workers quit from job to job. As
the reservoir of unemployment dries out, more productive firms find
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 2it profitable to start raising wages to raid workers from less productive
competitors. They respond by paying their workers more to retain
them. Wages rise both within firms and as workers upgrade by quit-
ting to higher‐paying employers. Workers quit mostly from small, low‐
paying firms to large, high‐paying firms. The growth in the employment
of large firms is fueled by the stock of employment at small firms, which
takes some time to replenish after a recession. Hence, employment at
small firms grows faster and peaks earlier than at large firms. As em-
ployment at small firms peaks and poaching becomes a more important
source of hiring, the EE rate picks up.
The facts that we highlight and use to support the above view of la-
bor market expansions are limited in time and scope by data availabil-
ity. The bulk of our data cover only the last two expansions, which have
been uniquely “jobless.” Thus we do not claim to have identified new
business cycle stylized facts. What we do claim is that the patterns we
point out for the last two expansions shed some light on the workings
of labor markets in general, mainly by identifying the hiring behavior
of large firms as an important channel for the propagation of aggregate
shocks.
We formalize those views within a wage‐posting model à la Burdett
and Mortensen. A calibrated example of the transitional dynamics of
the wage‐posting model, following an aggregate productivity shock,
exhibits many of the qualitative features of our new facts. Larger firms
pay more at any point in time. Employment growth is faster at small
firms early on, and then large firms take over as they poach employees.
Wages rise slowly at first and then accelerate. The job‐to‐job quit rate
rises for some time as the pool of workers at small firms, vulnerable to
poaching, expands.
A detailed theoretical analysis of the transitional dynamics of the
Burdett‐Mortensen model, which we simulate in this paper, is available
in Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay (2008). Because of the known complexity
of this problem, in the present paper we restrict attention to a certain
class of equilibria (which we call rank‐preserving), as defined and moti-
vated in the text. We further confine the analysis to the deterministic
transition to a steady state following an unanticipated, permanent ag-
gregate productivity shock. Before the shock, firms pay constant wages
in a stationary world. After the shock, firms post and commit to new
contracts that pay wages contingent only on either calendar time or
the unemployment rate. All workers in a firm are paid the same wage,
no matter when hired or from where. Workers receive offers both off
and on the job and decide which ones to accept on the basis of their
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 3implied present discounted value of wages, taking future transitions
into account.
In our computed example, firms back‐load wages to the late part of
the expansion. In steady‐state analysis of wage‐tenure contracts, wages
are back‐loaded late in the employment relationship to piggyback on
future poachers. If workers are risk neutral, back‐l o a d i n gi se x t r e m e
in the form of a step function of tenure (Stevens 2004). Gradual wage
growth requires risk aversion and extreme market incompleteness as
a motive for consumption smoothing (Burdett and Coles 2003). In
our setup, wages grow slowly even if workers are risk neutral and
capital markets are perfect; wage back‐loading occurs over calendar
time, not over tenure. Beyond the piggybacking motive, the increasing
scarcity of cheap hires from unemployment makes raising wages more
attractive in order to poach employed workers, thus also to retain own
employees.
While the process of upgrading from job to job is usually described as
climbing a wage ladder, our non‐steady‐state analysis reveals that it is
best described as jumping from a “wage escalator” up to a higher one.
All workers benefit as wages rise within firms. In addition, job changers
rise from one rising wage profile to a higher one at another firm. There-
fore, aggregate wages rise for two reasons: on the intensive margin, all
workers are paid progressively more, and on the extensive margin,
workers move to higher‐paying firms.
In our example, job changers exhibit faster (so, in this limited sense,
more procyclical) wage growth than job stayers. This prediction is con-
sistent with the main findings of the literature on real wage cyclicality
(Bils 1985; Beaudry and DiNardo 1991; Solon, Barsky, and Parker
1994). This literature, however, has been hampered by the lack of
high‐frequency, reliable information on job‐to‐job transitions in a repre-
sentative sample. We present such evidence from the monthly Current
Population Survey (CPS) starting in 1994, when it first became avail-
able, but we have not yet linked it to individual wage information. A
similar view holds that workers flow from low‐wage to high‐wage in-
dustries in an expansion, a “cyclical upgrading of labor” (Okun 1973).
This is based on the observation that high‐wage industries have more
cyclical employment. Barlevy (2001), however, shows that the inter-
industry wage gains reflect to some extent the compensating differential
associated with accepting riskier jobs. While the source of interindustry
wage differentials is still an open question, we show that the patterns of
employment growth by firm and establishment size that we uncover
hold within, and not across, industries.
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 4Our example also features a strong propagation in wages and labor
productivity, which keep rising years after the initial shocks, although
the unemployment rate transition’s half‐life is just a few months. The
main reason is that job‐to‐job transitions in the data are an order of
magnitude slower than the reallocation from unemployment to em-
ployment. Thus, the upgrading process is slow, and so is the rise in labor
productivityafteraninitialjumpfollowingtheshock.Thepropagationis
less pronounced for the EE rate. We are, however, ignoring further
sources of propagation of the unemployment rate, such as endogenous
labor force participation. This is likely to rise in the expansion, feeding
the market with relatively cheap candidates for hiring from unemploy-
ment and delaying the moment when large firms have to start raising
wages aggressively to poach workers, the small firms have to respond
to retain them, and the EE rate peaks.
Section II lays out the facts and offers an intuitive explanation of
them based on the Burdett‐Mortensen equilibrium search model. The
rest of the paper discusses the theoretical model and its quantitative
predictions. Section III describes the basic economic environment. Sec-
tion IV characterizes the dynamic labor marketequilibrium and explains
our solution strategy. Details and results of a simple calibration exercise
are presented and discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI presents
conclusions and gives some thoughts about possible further research
avenues.
II. Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations: New Evidence
A. Definitions and Overview
In order to organize the new evidence under a common heading, we
open this section by providing our own definition of a tight labor mar-
ket. We apply an HP (Hodrick‐Prescott) filter to both the monthly ci-
vilian unemployment rate and the monthly civilian employment to
working‐age population ratio (E/POP ratio) from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) in 1948:1–2008:1. We choose a smoothing parameter
equal to 105   32:25, which corresponds to Shimer’s (2005) choice of
10
5 at a quarterly frequency.
2 In figure 1 we plot the deviations of the
unemployment rate and the E/POP ratio from their respective postwar
trends.
3 We show the resulting detrended series by zooming only on
1975–2008, because this is the longest span covered by our other data
series. Clearly, the unemployment rate crosses its trend from above in
1977, 1984–85, 1995–96, and 2005. In the second and third episodes, it
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 5hovers around trend for almost 2 years but is higher before and lower
after that point in time during an expansion, further corroborating our
detrending choice.
Armed with this graph, we define the labor market to be tight when
the unemployment rate first falls below its trend and remains there for
at least a year thereafter. The window of at least 12 months of consecu-
tive observations above or below trend, before/after first crossing it, is
necessary to eliminate neutral phases, when the unemployment rate
hovers near trend. Notice that this definition does not coincide with
that of an expansion or recession according to NBER dates (materi-
alized on all figures by vertical lines, solid for peaks and dashed for
troughs). Indeed, the phases of labor market neutrality occur typically
roughly midway between troughs and peaks, although the unemploy-
mentrateitselfdoesnothavesymmetricdynamics,typicallyrisingfaster
than it declines. From every cyclical trough in the sample period, the la-
bor market starts slack, then shifts into neutral, and finally tightens, until
the next peak.
Although we have chosen to couch this definition in terms of the un-
employment rate, it is evident from figure 1 that the E/POP ratio is an
equally good indicator of labor market tightness as defined above, since
Fig. 1. Employment and unemployment rates. The solid line is the unemployment
rate. The dashed line is the E/POP ratio. HP‐filtered U.S. monthly data, 1978:1–2008:1.
HP trends are calculated over the entire postwar series (1948:1–2008:1) with smoothing
parameter 105   32:25, then MA smoothed. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates
NBER peaks (troughs). Source: BLS and authors' calculations.
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 6the cyclical behavior of the E/POP ratio is essentially the mirror image
of that of the unemployment rate (the correlation coefficient of the two
series over the entire postwar period is −0.92). In other words, as far as
labor market cycle dating is concerned, cyclical variations in labor force
participation can be ignored to a first approximation. We will implicitly
make this approximation throughout the paper, especially in the theory
in which the participation margin will be shut down altogether.
The three new facts that we uncover and document in this section
concern three seemingly unrelated time series in the last few decades.
Armed with our definition of tight and slack labor markets, we can
briefly characterize them as follows. We first describe them verbally
and later graphically rather than reporting correlations of detrended se-
ries, becausemany ofthe available time seriescoveronly a couple of busi-
ness cycles.
Fact 1. Small firms and establishments grow in size faster than large
oneswhenthelabormarketisslack,andviceversawhenthelabormarket
turns tight. Therefore, the firm/establishment size distribution gets com-
pressed in a slack labor market and becomes more unequal in a tight one.
Fact 2. The rate at which employed workers quit to other jobs is
above trend in a tight labor market and below trend in a slack labor
market.
Fact 3. The annual growth rate of real wages or weekly earnings is
above its trend in a tight labor market and below in a slack labor market.
We now describe the three facts in detail.
B. The Cyclical Dynamics of the Firm/Establishment Size Distribution
Most of the new empirical evidence that we present in this paper per-
tains to fact 1, the relative timing of net job creation within a business
cycle by size classes. Essentially, of the total job creation observed from
cyclical trough to peak, more of it occurs early on in the expansion for
small firms/establishments than for larger ones. In recessions, large
firms/establishments are hit particularly hard. Notice that this fact does
not say that most job creation occurs at small establishments, a well‐
known subject of political rhetoric and confusion. Our finding is about
the movement of the relative growth rate. While the political debate is
typically focused on growth rates, it is still the case that the number of
jobs added by large establishments is higher than that added by small
ones or by entrants at nearly all points in the aggregate expansion.
4
Reflecting the dual structure of its statistical agencies, the U.S. federal
government has produced two comprehensive and independent
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count, employment, payroll, industry, and location. Business Employ-
ment Dynamics (BED) is a data set providing quarterly information on
job flows and firm sizes since 1992. It is based on the quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages, which in turn collects information from the
state and federal Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems accruing to the
BLS for this purpose. The BED covers all employers subject to UI taxes,
which account for 98% of employment. While used primarily to mea-
sure job flows, information on employment stocks is publicly available
when aggregated into nine classes of firm size.
5
The second data set is the County Business Patterns (CBP), which is
maintained at the Bureau of the Census and derives from the Business
Register and quinquennial economic censuses. The publicly available
i n f o r m a t i o nf r o mt h eC B Pt h a tw eh a v eb e e na b l et os e c u r ec o n s i s t s
of annual information on counts, employment, industry, payroll, and
location for all U.S. firms (since 1988) and establishments (since 1990),
as well on nonemployers (self‐employed) for 1992 and 1997–2005. Lim-
ited longitudinal information on employment growth by initial firm
size in CBP is publicly available, under the name of Business Informa-
tion Tracking Series (BITS) at the Census Bureau and Dynamic Size In-
formation at the Small Business Administration.
6
1. Employment Shares and Growth Rates by Size Classes
The firm size distribution series from BED, available in 1992–2007, show
that small (in terms of employment) firms had a countercyclical share of
total employment. They concentrated most of their job creation in the
early part of the 1990s expansion and promptly expanded their employ-
ment after 2001. Conversely, large firms concentrated most of their
1990s job creation after 1996 and again failed to create jobs in the first
part of the 2000s expansion. This pattern is observed across nine firm size
classes and is exemplified in figure 2, which plots employment shares for
four different classes. The recoveries of the early 1990s and 2000s were
“jobless” mainly at large firms, whereas the strong job creation of the
late 1990s, in the mature phase of the expansion, was concentrated
mainly in large firms.
7
The evidence for firms from BED can also be illustrated in terms of
growth rates of employment rather than employment shares. The top
two panels of figure 3 plot average employment growth rates of large
and small firms. The bottom two panels report the difference in average
employment growth rates between large and small firms (the two series
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 8Fig. 2. Fraction of firms and employment shares—small vs. large firms. The solid line
is the unemployment rate. The dashed line is the share of firms. The solid (dashed) vertical
line indicates NBER peaks (troughs). Source: BED (quarterly) and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 3. Difference in average growth rates of employment across firm size classes.
Differential firm size growth, MA smoothed. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates
NBER peaks (troughs). Source: BED and authors’ calculations.on the corresponding top panel): when the series is positive, large firms
grow faster, and vice versa.
8 The two columns of figure 3 relate to two
different definitions of the “small” and “large” classes, as indicated on
each panel. This highlights more vividly the pattern of figure 2: wher-
ever one places the cutoff between small and large firms, small firms
appear to have grown (relatively) faster than large firms at the begin-
ning of the 1990s expansion and slower later on in that same expansion.
A similar pattern seems to appear again at the beginning of the 2000s
expansion. Focusing on the top two panels of figure 3, one can further
decompose that pattern by noticing that average size growth of small
firms actually trends down over the expansion, whereas that of large
firms does not trend. This is why large firms take over on average.
Hence these series of average growth rates by firm size class, albeit
all clearly procyclical, diverge to some extent.
To further illustrate this pattern, figure 4 shows the comovements be-
tween growth differentials across firm size classes (the series on the
right panel of fig. 3) and the aggregate unemployment rate.
9 Although
the two series fluctuate with a different amplitude, one sees that they
exhibit very strong comovements: the correlation between growth rate
differentials and the unemployment rate series is about −0.76 over the
observation window.
10
Fig. 4. Growth rate differentials, employment, and unemployment rates. The solid
line is differential firm size growth, and the dashed line is the unemployment rate. All
series are MA smoothed. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs).
Source: BED, BLS, and authors’ calculations.
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 10Similar firm‐level evidence can be constructed at an annual fre-
quency, but beginning in 1988, from the CBP data, which are available
at the firm (as well as establishment) level. CBP conveys only informa-
tion on employment shares, which is our main focus, and not on firm
counts,sincethisparticularversionofthedataaggregatesnonemployers
with small firms in some years and not in others. This inconsistency
makes cross‐date comparisons of firm counts impossible but does
not affect employment since we have been excluding the self‐employed
throughout. Figure 5 repeats figures 2 and 3 using CBP firm‐level data
and confirms the pattern already observed in BED, not only for the 1990s
and early 2000s but also around the previous recession, since we now
also encompass 1988–91.
While the distinction between firms and establishments is often a
thorny issue in theoretical exercises, fortunately for us this will not be
the case. The same empirical phenomenon emerges from establishment‐
level data using the CBP since 1990 (see fig. 6, which replicates fig. 2 for
establishments). The pattern of establishment size dynamics over the
last two business cycles closely resembles that of firm size dynamics,
partly owing to the fact that most (small) firms are mono‐establishment.
More generally, however, large establishments tend to be part of large
Fig. 5. Employment shares and employment growth by firm size classes, CBP firm‐level
data. Employment shares (top row) and growth rates (bottom row). The solid (dashed)
vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs). Source: CBP (firm‐level data set) and authors’
calculations.
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 11firms. If one looks across firm size bins in the CBP, the correlation be-
tween the average number of establishments of the firm and the aver-
age size of employment per establishment is close to one.
Overall, we conclude that large firms and establishments grow rela-
tively faster when the labor market is tight according to our earlier
definition, and vice versa for small ones.
2. The Reclassification Bias
Whileourlaststatementmightappearplausibleandintuitive,thefollowing
issue still needs to be resolved: the identity of firms in different size classes
changesovertime.Firmsandestablishmentsare reclassifiedat eachobser-
vation date according to their new size. Indeed the BED dataset explicitly
applies “dynamic allocation” of firms to size classes; that is, it even
changes class assignments at an infraquarterly frequency for firms cross-
ing the line between two size classes. Thus, in a growing economy, where
firms gain size on average, one would expect the distribution of firm size
to rise in a stochastic dominance sense. We refer to this issue as the reclas-
sification bias.
To eliminate reclassification, we need longitudinal links on firms/
establishments to fix their assignment to size classes (or average wage
Fig. 6. Employment shares by establishment size. The solid (dashed) vertical line
indicates NBER peaks (troughs). Source: CBP (yearly) and authors’ calculations.
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 12classes, or value‐added classes) at a cyclical trough then track over the
expansion the shares of employment at these classes of employers,
without reclassifying them every period. This would allow us to verify,
for example, whether firms/establishments that are initially small often
leapfrog and overtake the initially larger ones, a phenomenon that
would invalidate our interpretation of the facts.
To this purpose, we utilize two publicly available longitudinal data
sets on U.S. firms. The first is Compustat, which comprises only listed
companies. We fix firm identities in 1975 and classify them once and for
all in size bins (by employment): large above 5,000 employees and
small fewer than 5,000. The reason for the large size cutoff is that listed
companies are very large. Then, for each year from 1976 to 2005, we
calculate the growth rate of employment over the past year at (initially)
large firms and subtract the growth rate of the other initially small firms
in the sample. We plot this difference in growth rates in figure 7 in a
way that mimics figure 3. Consistent with the pattern uncovered in
the BED, over three full business cycles this difference in growth rates
is procyclical and crosses zero when the labor market turns tight.
Compustat is not a representative sample, but the CBP is. Although
the underlying source of micro data is not publicly available, the Cen-
sus Bureau publishes employment growth by firm size, where firms are
Fig. 7. Growth rate differentials across size classes for a fixed sample of publicly traded
U.S. companies classified by size in 1975. Differential firm size growth: over 5,000 minus
under 5,000 employees. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs).
Source: Compustat North American files and authors’ calculations.
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 13assigned to categories according to size on March 12 each year and stay
in the same class for 1 year.
11 This data set, BITS, exploits the longitudi-
nal links in CBP for just one year at a time. In figure 8 we plot our find-
ings from BITS, again in terms of differences in growth rates. Every
year since 1989, that is, since BITS data are publicly available, we com-
pute the growth rate of employment over the subsequent year among
firms that started above 500 employees in March of year t and subtract
the growth rate for the 1–499 employees size class. A positive number
indicates that firms that were larger in March of year t grew faster than
the other ones until March of year t þ 1, when they were reclassified
after the relevant growth rates were computed. The evidence is again
fairly clear‐cut, whether one detrends or not: small firms grow faster
early in an expansion; the pattern then slowly reverses, to switch back





in this subsection is also observed within industries or whether it mostly
reflectsa reallocation oflabor acrossindustries.Morespecifically,isit the
Fig. 8. Growth rate differentials across size classes for all U.S. firms, reclassified every
year in March after computing the growth rate over the past year. Differential firm
size growth: over 500 minus under 500 employees. The solid (dashed) vertical line
indicates NBER peaks (troughs). Source: BITS and authors’ calculations.
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 14case that smallfirms exhibit fastergrowthat early stages of an expansion
whereas large firms take over later on uniformly across industries, or is
it that job creation early on is concentrated at industries that tend to be
populated by smaller firms, whereas industries with larger firms have a
“slower start”? The answer turns out to be the former.
Figure 9 plots series equivalent to the one displayed in figure 8 for
eight broad industries.
12 Although industry‐level data are inevitably
more noisy, the aggregate pattern shown on the upper‐left panel (a rep-
etition of fig. 8) seems by and large to apply across industries. In all
cases, without exceptions, the disaggregated industry series drop on
or around recessions. Those series cross the trend from below only
around 1996 in five of the eight industries: construction; transportation,
communication, and public utilities (TCPU); wholesale trade; finance,
insurance, and real estate (FIRE); and services. The pattern is similar
in manufacturing, except for the sharp drop in 1996. Manufacturing
is the industry in which the firm/employment size distribution is most
skewed toward large values, an outlier in the economy at large, so
small firms play a lesser role. In fact, the largest size cutoff available
in BITS is 500 employees, which is well above the median firm size
for all industries but is well below the median for manufacturing; so
this data set is not really informative for manufacturing, where the vast
Fig. 9. Growth rate differentials across size classes for all U.S. firms, size classes
fixed over a year, by industry. Differential firm size growth: over 500 minus under
500 employees. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs).
Source: BITS and authors’ calculations.
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 15majority of firms need to be classified as “large.”
13 The pattern is less
clean in retail trade, but even there small firms grow faster early on
after the recessions. Mining is the only (small) industry that does not
fit the general picture at all. The effect on the other (between‐industry)
margin can also be assessed using the BITS data, for instance, by look-
ing at the difference in employment growth between industries popu-
l a t e db yf i r m sw h o s es i z ei sa b o v et h ee c o n o m y w i d ea v e r a g ea n d
industries with comparatively smaller firms. A plot of this difference
(not reported here) suggests that this between‐industry difference has
no particular cyclical pattern, contrary to the within‐industry series
plotted in figure 9. This finding will make an interesting contribution
to our discussion of how to interpret the facts below.
C. The Cyclical Dynamics of Employer‐to‐Employer Transitions
MonthlyCPSdataavailablesince1994allowtheconstructionofmonthly
EE transition rate series.
14 Such a series, compiled by Moscarini and
Thomsson (2007), is plotted in figure 10 (in deviation from HP trend), to-
gether with the unemployment rate series from figure 1 to highlight the
EE rate’s cyclical behavior in terms of our adopted definition of labor
market tightness.
Fig. 10. Monthly transition rate of employed workers to other employers. The solid line
is the EE rate, and the dashed line is the unemployment rate. EE rate: U.S. monthly data,
deviation from linear trend, MA smoothed. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates
NBER peaks (troughs). Source: CPS, BLS, Moscarini and Thomsson (2007), and authors’
calculations.
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 16Our guiding hypothesis relates the time and cross‐employer varia-
tion in poaching activity to wage growth. Publicly available data from
the Census’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
15 con-
veys information about the workforce size of an individual’s current
employer (employing establishment) as well as individual job histories.
This allows a crude analysis of the poaching activity of establishments
as a function of their size. Figure 11 plots a measure of the fraction of
new hires coming from another employer (i.e., following an EE transi-
tion) for three categories of hiring establishment size.
16 In other words,
it plots a measure of the importance of poaching in the recruitment ac-
tivity of establishments, by size of the hiring establishment. Changes in
the design of the SIPP and other data limitations restrict the period over
which that indicator can be constructed to the years shown on figure 11.
While this admittedly constitutes very limited evidence, we still notice
the following two points. First, and consistent with the evidence pre-
sented in figure 10, poaching was more intense in the latter half of the
1990s expansion than in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 recession.
This is true for all three categories of establishment size. Second, larger
establishments almost always poach morethan smaller ones. This differ-
ence in “poaching intensity,” however, is more pronounced in 1997–99,
when the labor market turns tight, than in 2002–4, when it is slack.
Fig. 11. Poaching and establishment size. The fraction of new hires coming from other
employers, by establishment size category. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates
NBER peaks (troughs). Source: SIPP and authors’ calculations.
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 17D. The Cyclical Dynamics of Wages and Earnings
Third, and finally, we revisit the age‐old issue of real wage cyclicality.
Our hypothesis is that the evolution of employment by firm size and
job‐to‐job transitions fuel aggregate wage growth. Publicly available
data from the BLS Current Employment Statistics on average monthly
real (weekly and hourly) earnings show, after standard HP detrending,
a behavior similar to that of the other variables that we have studied so
far: flat in the first part of an expansion and sharply increasing later on.
This occurs in every complete U.S. business cycle in 1964–2006, with the
only exception of the 1980s, when a sharp decline in real wages of un-
skilled workers gave rise to the well‐known increase in wage inequality.
We do not report these raw data, but in order to isolate the pure cyclical
effect, we first attempt to control for composition effects in employment
over a suitably long time period.
We gather information on earnings, hours, and demographics from
the Merged Outgoing Rotations of the monthly CPS, starting in 1982
when they became available. We take percentage wage growth over
subsequent 12 months for the same individual as the object to be ex-
plained in order to eliminate fixed effects in wage levels. Results for
weekly earnings rather than hourly wages are very similar. We regress
wage growth on many demographics to capture also composition ef-
fects by observables in wage changes. Since we have only two observa-
tions on wage levels and one on wage growth per individual, we cannot
estimate individual fixed effects in growth rates. Finally, we plot the
median residual from this regression month by month in figure 12.
We also plot the 52nd percentile of the residual distribution in order
to take into account the proportion of top‐coded earnings (between
0% and 2% per month), which create a spurious mass of zero or very
low wage growth. The unemployment rate (again in deviation from HP
trend) is also superimposed to gauge cyclicality. Relative to the first
month, January 1982, rescaled to zero, unexplained wage growth is pos-
itive in the late 1980s and especially late 1990s, when the labor market
was tight according to our definition, and negative in early 1990s and
2000s, when it was slack.
A breakdown of the mean wage series by establishment size catego-
ries can be obtained from the CBP data. This is reported in figure 13
(once again the CBP data start only in 1990). This figure is remarkable
in at least two respects. First, mean wages are monotonically increas-
ing in establishment size at all dates. This is another rendition of the
well‐documented firm size–wage gap (see Oi and Idson [1999] for an
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 18Fig. 12. Median and 52nd percentile of residual growth rate of individual hourly wages
unexplained by employment composition effects. The solid line is the median wage,
the dashed line is the 52nd percentile wage, and the dash‐dot line is the unemployment
rate. U.S. monthly data, all series MA smoothed. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates
NBER peaks (troughs). Source: CPS and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 13. Wages by establishment size. Detrended log wages by establishment size
category. The solid (dashed) vertical line indicates NBER peaks (troughs).overview).
17 Second, all wage profiles plotted in figure 13 are nearly
parallel. In other words, the distribution of mean wages by establish-
ment size shows no clear sign of collapsing or fanning out over time.
As a consequence, the aggregate pattern of wage dynamics (and the
associated wage “stickiness”) holds roughly unchanged in each firm
size category.
E. Taking Stock of the Facts: A Hypothesis on Aggregate Labor
Market Fluctuations
All in all, EE rates, wages, and employment in large firms appeared to
comove: sluggish early in the last two expansions and brisk in the late
stages of the 1990s expansion (and possibly of the current one, since late
2005). Our facts appear to plainly contradict a well‐established set of
facts regarding the sensitivity of small firms to cyclical conditions
and monetary shocks. In a very influential paper, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) present evidence that small firms, which they argue are more
credit constrained, are more sensitive to recessions and to Romer and
Romer (1989) monetary policy shocks. They define size in terms of sales
and use a quarterly time series of the manufacturing sector, the Quar-
terly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, since 1958. The
data set is confined to manufacturing, has nominal sales as a size vari-
able (hence raising the issue of industry‐specific price indexes within
manufacturing), and is not immune to the reclassification bias, leading
Gertler and Gilchrist to make an ingenious yet ad hoc correction. In ad-
dition, their conclusion holds for Romer shocks, which are notoriously
controversial, and not for NBER‐dated recessions. Of the six recessions
in their sample period, only in 1970 one sees a clear collapse in the
growth rate of sales at small firms relative to large ones (their fig. I),
and the opposite occurs in 1982. The other four episodes appear fairly
neutral.
18 All in all, we believe that the picture of the whole economy
over NBER‐dated cycles for the postwar period, after one controls for
reclassification, is likely to be much closer to our conclusions than to
t h o s eo fG e r t l e ra n dG i l c h r i s t .I nt h ep e r i o dw ec o v e r ,s i n c et h el a t e
1980s, our facts about firm size and growth are very firmly established.
Surely the facts that we have highlighted pertain only to the last two
expansions and as such are not enough to establish an empirical regu-
larity. Yet, practitioners of macroeconomic forecasting have already
identified, at least qualitatively, some cyclical pattern of job creation
by employer size.
19 Commercial forecasters rely not only on some of
the statistics produced by the federal government that we exploit here
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tical quality but often going back in time much longer. Although we do
not put much weight on an established conventional wisdom of com-
mercial forecasters, at least it does not contradict the possibility that we
may, indeed, have identified new business cycle stylized facts. We
stress, however, that our search for facts has been guided mostly by
our theoretical hypothesis mentioned in the introduction and fully
spelled out below. Our conceptual framework will provide both an in-
terpretation of the facts and a motive to look further for additional facts
that might appear prima facie unrelated and that were previously un-
known to academic or commercial economists. Examples are the evolu-
tion of the firm size distribution in BED at a quarterly frequency and
the composition of new hires by size of new employers from SIPP.
Whatever their actual degree of regularity, our new facts, taken to-
gether, suggest the following pattern for at least the last two decades.
Early in an expansion, the large pool of unemployed workers sustains
firms’ monopsony power. Wages remain low, firms hire mostly from
unemployment, and relatively few workers quit from job to job. As
the reservoir of unemployment dries up, more and more of the new
hires arrive from other jobs. As poaching becomes the main source of
hiring, average wages and earnings rise and the EE rate picks up. If
workers quit mostly from small, low‐paying firms to large, high‐paying
firms, the growth in the employment of large firms will be fueled by the
stock of employment at small firms, which takes some time to replenish
after a recession. Hence, employment at small firms rises faster and
peaks earlierthanatlargefirms. Theerosionin firms’monopsony power
reduces average markups several years into an expansion, potentially
creating favorable conditions for a new recession.
This pattern is reminiscent of Okun’s (1973) idea of cyclical upgrading
(see Bils and McLaughlin [2001] for a recent new interpretation), a
cross‐industry pattern whereby labor reallocates itself from low‐ to
high‐paying industries. Instead the phenomena that we emphasize in
this section hold within industries (fig. 9) and not across. This is surely
worth noticing, although it does not pose a particular problem for our
proposed interpretation, which seems to apply equally well to many
industries. It is in fact natural to expect that, if workers have any sig-
nificant attachment to an industry, then they should upgrade within in-
dustries more than across.
While our proposed description of labor market dynamics might ap-
pear plausible and intuitive, it remains to verify whether in fact it can
beconsistentwithequilibriumbehavior.Tothispurpose,inthefollowing
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 21sections we study the transitional dynamics of the Burdett‐Mortensen
wage‐posting model with heterogeneous firms.
20 The Burdett‐Mortensen
model is the canonical framework for the analysis of frictional labor
markets that explicitly addresses firm size, job‐to‐job quits, wage dis-
persion, and unemployment, the four key ingredients of our facts. We
are not aware of any other model that can account for all four.
III. The Economy
Time is continuous. The labor market is populated by a unit mass of
workers who can be either employed or unemployed. Owing to search
frictions, unemployed workers can sample job offers sequentially only
at some finite Poisson rate λ0 > 0. Employed workers are allowed to
searchonthejobandfaceasamplingrateofjoboffersofλ1 > 0.Employed
workerslosetheirjobsandbecomeunemployedatrateδ > 0.Allworkers
are ex ante identical: they are infinitely lived, risk neutral, and equally
capable at any job; they discount future payoffs at rate ρ;a n dt h e ya t -
tach a common lifetime value of Ut to being unemployed at date t.
Workers face a measure N of active firms operating constant return
technologies with heterogeneous productivity levels p ∼Γð Þ among
firms, with support ½p;p . Firms are also infinitely lived and risk neutral
and discount future payoffs at rate r. We will assume, as standard,
r ¼ ρ, but we will maintain the separate notation to help the reader dis-
tinguish between workers’ and firms’ objectives functions.
For quantitative reasons that will become clear below, we assume
that thesamplingoffirmsbyworkers isnotuniform,in thatatypepfirm
has a sampling weight of qðpÞ > 0. Sampling weights are normalized in
such a way that their cumulated sum ΦðpÞ≔
R p
p qðxÞdΓðxÞ is a (sampling)
cumulative distribution function (cdf), that is, ΦðpÞ¼1. The sampling
densityofatypepfirmisthereforeφðpÞ≔qðpÞγðpÞ.Th isna tu ra ll yen c om -
passes the conventional case of uniform sampling, which has qðpÞ¼1f o r
all p. As we shall see later in the analysis, however, a plausible calibration
requires that qðpÞ be increasing in p.
21
At some initial date, which we normalize to be time 0, each firm of a
given type p commits to a wage profile fwtðpÞgt∈½0;þ∞Þ to be paid to all
itsworkersovertheinfinite future.WegeneralizetheBurdett‐Mortensen
restrictions placed on the set of feasible wage contracts to a non‐steady‐
state environment by preventing firms from making wages contingent
on anything other than calendar time.
22
Any such profile fwtðpÞgt∈½0;þ∞Þ offered by any type p firm yields a
continuation value of VtðpÞ t oa n yw o r k e re m p l o y e da tt h a tf i r ma t
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 22any date t. The (time‐varying) sampling distribution of job values is de-
noted as Ftð Þ, and its relationship to the sampling distribution of firm
types Φð Þ will be discussed momentarily. Because from the workers’
viewpoint jobs are identical in all dimensions but the wage profile, em-
ployed job seekers quit into higher‐valued jobs only. This gradual self‐
selection of workers into better jobs implies that the distribution of job
values in a cross section of workers—which will be denoted as Gtð Þ—
differs from the sampling distribution Ftð Þ.
IV. Equilibrium
A. The Contract‐Posting Problem
A firm of productivity p posts a wage profile over an infinite horizon to









VtðpÞþwt   δ½VtðpÞ Ut þλ1
Z þ∞
VtðpÞ
½x   VtðpÞ dFtðxÞ; ð2Þ
:
LtðpÞ¼  ½ δ þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ LtðpÞþ
qðpÞ
N
½λ0ut þ λ1ð1   utÞGtðVtðpÞÞ ;
ð3Þ
and
wt ≥ w; ð4Þ
where (with a slight notational abuse) LtðpÞ denotes a type p firm’sw o r k -
force atdatet,
23 w isthe exogenous institutional minimumwage, Ut isthe
workers’lifetimevalueofunemployment,andFtð Þ ¼ 1   Ftð Þdesignates
the survivor function associated with Ftð Þ. When solving (1), the typical
firm of productivity p is also constrained by its given initial size L0ðpÞ.
The firm’s problem has two state variables that the firm controls
through the wage. First, the chosen path of wages translates through
the Hamilton‐Jacobi‐Bellman equation (2) into a value VtðpÞ for the
worker of employment at that type p firm. The worker’s opportunity
cost ρVtðpÞ equals the capital gain plus the flow wage minus the capital
loss when the match is destroyed exogenously at rate δ, plus the capital
gainthatoccursatrateλ1FtðVtðpÞÞwhentheworkerreceivesan offer that
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from the endogenous offer distribution Ftð Þ, which is the cross‐section
distribution at time t of all such values offered by other firms.
In turn, the value VtðpÞ offered by a type p firm translates into in-
flows and outflows of workers. The only friction in the model is search,
so the boundaries of the firm are defined by attrition, retention, and hir-
ing. Equation (3) describes the evolution of the firm’s employment. Fol-
lowing standard practice, we impose a law of large numbers at the
individual firm’s level and we treat the evolution of firm size as deter-
ministic, although it is the result of various random events. These in-
clude separations—both exogenous at rate δ and endogenous at rate
λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ when a worker receives a better offer—that reduce employ-
ment and accessions both from unemployment (at rate λ0) and from
other firms that are paying their workers less than VtðpÞ. For future ref-
erence, notice the role played by the unemployment rate ut in (3). It pro-
vides an exogenous inflow of workers that does not depend on the
firm’s wage policy. Therefore, the firm’s incentives to post a costly, high
wage depend on how easy or difficult it is to hire from unemployment,
as opposed to poaching from other firms, as well as on retention needs
given current size.
At the individual firm’s level, the sampling and cross‐sectional distri-
butions of job values Ftð Þ and Gtð Þ are given macroeconomic quantities
that no individual firm can affect with its choice. Given all of a firm’s
choices of wages and the implied worker values VtðpÞ and firm sizes












where If g is an indicator function. Notice that both are normalized to
be proper cdf’s. Also notice an important restriction that was kept im-
plicit so far: the definitions in (5) and (6) are valid only in symmetric
equilibria in which there is no dispersion in firm size conditional on
p (i.e., p ↦ VtðpÞ and p ↦ LtðpÞ are well‐defined mappings for all t).
We will limit our attention to such equilibria.
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Ut þ b þ λ0
Z þ∞
Ut
ðx   UtÞdFtðxÞ; ð7Þ
with b denoting the income flow in unemployment, or the unemploy-
ment rate ut, which solves
: ut ¼ δð1   utÞ λ0ut; ð8Þ
with





Before we move on to solving (1), we should clarify that our formu-
lation of the contract‐posting game and the firm’s best‐response prob-
lem contains the assumption that a firm must pay all its workers the
same wage, irrespective of when they were hired, where they were
hired from, and the outside offers that some of them may have re-
ceived. In particular, the firm does not renege on its promised wage,
cannotconditionthewageontenureorreceivedoutsideoffers,andmore
generally does not respond to outside offers to its employees, but lets
them go if they are offered more.
25
Finally, as we are solving for the equilibrium of a dynamic game be-
tween firms and workers, we need to spell out out‐of‐equilibrium play.
First, firms commit to wage offers vis‐à‐v i sw o r k e r s .T h e yw i l lb e
tempted to renege and to offer their employees just the value of unem-
ployment, leading again to the Diamond (1971) paradox. Possible repu-
tational mechanisms to support this commitment have been explored,
and we maintain this assumption. Formally, the wage that the firm
plans at time 0 is the same wage that enters the worker’s Hamilton‐
Jacobi‐Bellman equation (2) at any future date t > 0. Second, the firm
takes as given the paths of distribution of its competitor’ss t r a t e g i e s
Ft and Gt. That is, no unilateral deviation can change the distributions
of offered and earned values in the market. The zero measure of a firm
is necessary but not sufficient for this. If an individual deviation was
publicly observed, it could serve as a coordination device for a positive
measure set of other firms to respond. Hence, we assume that wage of-
fers are observed only by the workers who receive them. Any worker
could spreadthenewsofthepastdeviation onlytothe atmostcountable
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sumptions, the solution to the wage path posting problem is time con-
sistent, by the principle of optimality.
B. Optimality Conditions
The current‐value Hamiltonian of problem (1) is defined by
HtðpÞ¼ð p   wtÞLtðpÞþmtðpÞðwt   wÞ
þ πtðpÞ
 









þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ VtðpÞ λ1
Z þ∞
VtðpÞ
xdFtðxÞ wt   δUt
 
; ð9Þ
where νtðpÞ (πtðpÞ) is the costate associated with VtðpÞ (LtðpÞ)a n d
mtðpÞ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the minimum
wage constraint (4).
Optimality conditions are
νtðpÞ¼  LtðpÞþmtðpÞ; ð10Þ
:
νtðpÞ¼rνtðpÞ ½ ρ þ δ þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ νtðpÞ
  λ1ftðVtðpÞÞLtðpÞπtðpÞ 
λ1qðpÞ
N
ð1   utÞgtðVtðpÞÞπtðpÞ; ð11Þ
:
πtðpÞ¼½ r þ δ þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ πtðpÞ p þ wtðpÞ; ð12Þ






e rtνtðpÞ½VtðpÞ Ut ¼0: ð14Þ
Supplementing this latter set of conditions with the state equations (3),
(7), and (8), we obtain a system of partial differential equations charac-
terizing the solution to an individual firm’s maximization problem for a
given path of sampling distributions fFtð Þgt∈½0;þ∞Þ. Given a solution to
that system, the optimal wage path can be retrieved using (2). The main
difficulty, however, lies in characterizing the equilibrium fFtð Þgt∈½0;þ∞Þ,
that is, the path of sampling distributions that is consistent with the
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firms. This task will be carried out in the following subsections. Before
we turn to that, however, it is worth spelling out some economic inter-
pretation of the above optimality conditions.
As usual in economic applications of optimal control, the costate
variables πtðpÞ and νtðpÞ are interpreted as the imputed unit value of
the corresponding state variable at date t (i.e., LtðpÞ and VtðpÞ, respec-
tively). Note that νt is negative since it is costly for any firm to transfer a
higher value to its employees.
Equation (12) describes the dynamics of the firm’s shadow value of
its marginal employee. Notice that the overall rate at which the firm
will discount that value is the sum of sheer time discounting (at the in-
terest rate r) plus a “depreciation rate” of δ þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ reflecting fu-
ture match dissolution, through either job destruction or the worker
quitting. With that in mind, equation (12) has a straightforward asset‐
pricing‐type interpretation whereby the firm’sm a r g i n a le m p l o y e ei s
viewed as an asset priced at πtðpÞ. The annuity value of the marginal
employee, ½r þ δ þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ πtðpÞ, must then equal the return on the
corresponding asset, which is the sum of a dividend term p   wtðpÞ
plus a capital gain term
:
πtðpÞ.
Equation(11)nextdescribesthedynamicsofthefirm’ssh ad owva lu eof
a unit increasein the value it yields toits employees. It can also be viewed
asanasset‐pricing equation(eventhoughinthiscase wearereallytalking
aboutacostsinceνtðpÞisnegative)wherebytheannuityvaluerνtðpÞisset
equal to the capital gain
:
νtðpÞ plus a dividend term that represents the net
benefitofincreasingVtðpÞbyoneunitthroughtheeffectofthatincreaseon
future profit streams (the effect of such an increase on current profits















in the value offered to workers. The second dividend component (in fact






¼ νtðpÞ½ρ þ δ þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ ;
has a somewhat less tangible interpretation. It measures the cost that
the firm incurs through the change in the capital gain achieved by its
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to them,VtðpÞ.Thischangein capitalgainisproportionalto theworkers’
overall discount rate, which again results from a combination of pure
time discounting (at rate ρ) and a risk of leaving the match (rate δ þ
λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ). A possible way to interpret this is to view an employer’s
commitment to transferring a certain value to its workers as that em-
ployer running up a debt to its employees. The consequence of a mar-
ginally higher current stock of debt is to increase the debt burden and
speed up debt accumulation by an amount proportional to the interest
paid on that debt, which here is indicated by the workers’ discount rate.
Finally, equation (10) simply reflects the optimal balance between the
instantaneous cost of increasing the current posted wage by $1—it
adds $LtðpÞ to the current wage bill, plus possibly the instantaneous
benefit of slackening the minimum wage constraint that is given by the
Lagrange multiplier mtðpÞ—and the future benefit of doing so,  νtðpÞ.
The debt analogy can be used for interpretation here as well: the future
benefitofraisingthewageatdatetcomesaboutthroughareducedspeed
of debt accumulation (a smaller
:
VtðpÞ), which follows from a higher in-
stallment (a higher wage) paid at date t.
C. Rank‐Preserving Equilibria
All further formal analysis of the model will build on the following
definition.
Definition 1 (Rank‐preserving equilibrium). A rank‐preserving
equilibrium (RPE) is a dynamic equilibrium in which firms post values
that are strictly increasing in p for all t.
A direct consequence of the above definition is that in an RPE work-
ers rank firms according to productivity at all dates. The following two
properties hold true at all dates under the RP assumption:




At all points in time, the fraction of firms that offer a value less than the
Vt(p)offeredbyfirmpequalsthe(sampling-weighted)proportionoffirms
that are less productive than p. And the measure of employed workers
who are paid less than Vt(p) equals the measure of employment at firms
that are less productive than p. In addition to considerably simplifying
equilibrium determination (see below), the RP assumption is theoretically
appealingforatleasttworeasons.First,itparallelsawell‐knownproperty
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haveauniqueequilibriuminwhichworkersrankfirmsaccordingtoproduc-
tivity. Second, RPEs feature constrained‐efficient labor reallocation at all
dates: if workers consistently rank more productive firms higher than less
productive ones, then job‐to‐job moves will always be up the productivity
ladder.
26 Under some relatively mild conditions on the initial distribution
of employment, equilibrium must be RP, as we establish in Moscarini
and Postel‐Vinay (2008), to which we refer the interested reader.
Let us consider the stock of workers employed at a firm of type p or
less, QtðpÞ¼
R p
p LtðxÞdΓðxÞ. In an RPE (assuming one exists), those firms
hire workers fromunemployment andlose workers totheirmore produc-
tive competitors (firms of type higher than p). The stock of workers under














Q′ tðpÞ¼LtðpÞγðpÞ,w eo b t a i nac l o s e d ‐form expression for the workforce












½1 þ λ1ðt   sÞΦðpÞ use½δþλ1ΦðpÞ sds
 
: ð15Þ
The steady‐state version of (15),
L∞ðpÞ¼
δλ0ðδ þ λ1ÞqðpÞ
Nðδ þ λ0Þ½δ þ λ1ΦðpÞ 
2 ; ð16Þ
motivates the introduction of sampling weights. In any RPE the most
(least) productive firm always wins (loses) against poachers, namely,
ΦðpÞ¼0 ¼ 1   ΦðpÞ. Since the RP property implies that size and pro-
ductivity are perfectly correlated in steady state, from (15) the steady‐
state size ratio of the largest to the smallest firm in the market in units











With uniform sampling (qðpÞ≡ 1 throughout), this ratio would equal
½1 þð λ1=δÞ 
2, which is in the order of 25–30 given standard estimates
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virtually infinite. More generally, it appears that the Burdett‐Mortensen
modelrequiresasamplingdistributionthatisveryheavilyskewedtoward
high‐productivity firms in order to replicate the observed distribution of
firm sizes. We discussed several possible interpretations/formalizations
of these sampling weights. This skew may be interpreted as a measure
of the inability of search frictions alone to generate a plausible firm
size distribution. Alternative forces that may contribute to shaping
the size distribution include credit constraints (Cooley and Quadrini
2001) and industry‐specific human capital accumulation (Rossi‐Hansberg
and Wright 2007). We note, however, that our frictions‐based approach
has the distinct advantage of generating observable implications in
terms of job‐to‐job quit rates by workers, wages within and across size
classes, which add considerable empirical discipline to the theoretical
exercise. Furthermore, exisiting theories of firm size have been so far
silent on aggregate dynamics.
Before going any further into characterizing RPE, we should notice
that the analysis of firm size and employment dynamics carried out in
this subsection would apply to any job ladder model in which a similar
conceptofRPEcanbedefined.IndeednothinginthedynamicsofLt orut
depends on the particulars of the wage‐setting mechanism, as long as
this is such that employed job seekers move from lower‐ranking into
higher‐ranking jobs in the sense of a time‐invariant ranking. Therefore,
thismodel’spredictionsabouteverythingrelatingtofirmsizesareinfact
much more general than the wage‐posting assumption retained in the
Burdett‐Mortensen model.
D. Rank‐Preserving Equilibria: Characterization
We now go back to the dynamical system characterizing the behavior of
the typical individual firm and analyze it in an RPE. The system in ques-
tion comprises the set of optimality conditions (10)–(14) plus the set of
stateequations(3),(2),and(8).Wefirstfocusonintervalsoftimeinwhich
the solution is interior, that is, such that mtðpÞ¼0 and wtðpÞ > w. In this
situation νtðpÞ¼  LtðpÞ. Substitution of (10) into (11) and combination
with (3) then yields
qðpÞ
N






ð1   utÞgtðVtðpÞÞ
 
: ð17Þ
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cost and benefit of marginally changing its posted value at date t.T h e
right‐hand side of (17) equals πtðpÞ ½ ∂
:
LtðpÞ=∂VtðpÞ  and clearly reflects
the benefit of offering a marginally higher value stemming from the
larger workforce achieved through the implied higher retention and hir-
ing rates. To see how the left‐hand side of (17) reflects the cost of a mar-
ginal increase in the value transferred to workers, it may help again to
view VtðpÞ as an employer’s debt to each of its employees. The (net)
interest paid on that debt equals the workers’ overall discount rate,
ρ þ δ þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ, less the firm’s discount (or interest) rate r. A unit
increase in the value offered to all of the firm’s employees then adds
LtðpÞ to the firm’s stock of debt. The marginal cost of such an addition
to the stock of debt is an increase in the debt burden, which in turn re-
sults from the net interest paid on that debt being raised by ½ρ   r þ δ þ
λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ LtðpÞ plus an extrinsic expansion/contraction term
:
LtðpÞ re-
flecting the fact that the stock of debt is by nature indexed to workforce
size. The sum of these latter two terms is equal to equation (17)’s left‐
hand side (under the assumption that r ¼ ρ).
Next define the shadow value to the firm‐worker match (rather than to
the firm) of the marginal unit of labor as μtðpÞ¼πtðpÞþVtðpÞ. Then a
combination of (2) and (12) yields
:
μtðpÞ¼½ r þ δ þ λ1FtðVtðpÞÞ μtðpÞ λ1
Z þ∞
VtðpÞ
xdFtðxÞ δUt   p; ð18Þ
which is supplemented by the transversality condition limt→þ∞ e rtLtðpÞ
 ½μtðpÞ Ut ¼0, obtained from adding the two conditions in (14) to-
gether and substituting the first‐order condition (10). Interpretation of
equation (18) is once again based on straightforward asset‐pricing‐type
arguments, and we shall therefore not dwell on it.











μtðpÞ¼½ r þ δ þ λ1ΦðpÞ μtðpÞ λ1
Z þ∞
p




e rtLtðpÞ½μtðpÞ Ut ¼0: ð21Þ
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 31Differentiation of (20) with respect to p yields (primes denote differen-
tiation with respect to p and dots denote time differentiation)
:
μ′ tðpÞ¼½ r þ δ þ λ1ΦðpÞ μ′ tðpÞþλ1γðpÞqðpÞ½VtðpÞ μtðpÞ    1: ð22Þ
This, together with (19), gives the following system of two partial dif-
ferential equations in ðμ′ tðpÞ;πtðpÞÞ:
:







This system can be solved numerically, subject to boundary condi-
tions in time, given by the steady‐state solution to (23),
μ′ ∞ðpÞ¼
1 þ λ1γðpÞqðpÞπ∞ðpÞ
r þ δ þ λ1ΦðpÞ
;
π∞ðpÞ¼
½δ þ λ1ΦðpÞ 
2




½δ þ λ1ΦðxÞ 
2 þ






and in productivity space. Standard arguments prove that the lowest‐
type firms have no reason to pay more than the minimum wage: type p
firms can hire only from unemployment and lose workers to poachers
anyway, so trying to prevent poaching by raising wages is pointless for
those firms in an RPE. While this implies that the minimum wage con-
straint (4) will bind at all dates for the lowest‐type firm, it also implies
that the following (time‐invariant) boundary conditions are satisfied:
πtðpÞ ≡
p   w
r þ δ þ λ1
and μ′ tðpÞ≡
1 þ λ1γðpÞqðpÞπtðpÞ
r þ δ þ λ1
; ð25Þ
where the second condition is obtained by combining the first one with
the
:
μ′ tðpÞ equation in (23). These can be further simplified by imposing
p ¼ w,ak i n do ff r e e ‐entry condition holding throughout the adjustment
towardthenewsteadystate,whichimpliesπtðpÞ ≡0.Theminimumproduc-
tivity p that can survive in the market is w, since any firm with p > w can
makepositiveprofitsbyofferingw,andpossiblyevenmorebyofferinga
higher wage, whereas no firm with p < w can ever make any profits.
Once (23) is solved for ðμ′tðpÞ;πtðpÞÞ, wages can be retrieved from
(12) (written under the RP assumption):
wtðpÞ¼p  ½ r þ δ þ λ1ΦðpÞ πtðpÞþ
:
πtðpÞ; ð26Þ
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This is exactly the Burdett‐Mortensen solution for the heterogeneous
firm case (see eq. [47] in Burdett and Mortensen [1998]). This confirms
that our contracts are consistent with the Burdett‐Mortensen steady‐
state wage‐posting equilibrium if the labor market is at a steady state.
It isnolonger thecaseoffsteadystate,however: postingatime‐invariant
wage is not, in general, a firm’s best response to all other firms posting
time‐invariant wages.
28
We now return to the minimum wage constraint. The only firm for
which the minimum wage constraint (4) is binding at the steady state
characterized above is the lowest‐type firm, p. It may be the case, how-
ever, that the constraint temporarily binds for some higher‐type firms
over the transition to that steady state, in which case the economy no
longer behaves according to (23) since mtðpÞ becomes strictly positive
for some p at some dates.
The appendix describes an algorithm that constructs an equilibrium
in which w is allowed to temporarily bind for some firms (at the lower
end of the p distribution) with the restriction that it bind only over some
initial period. In other words, any firm can choose to post the minimum
wage for a while right after the occurrence of the productivity shock,
but once it ceases to do so, it is not allowed to return to the minimum
wage. Simulations, however, will prove that the minimum wage is of-
fered only by the lowest‐p firms in equilibrium.
V. Quantitative Analysis of Rank‐Preserving Equilibria
A. Baseline Calibration
A sampling distribution of firm types is first calibrated following the
Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (2000) procedure in such a way
that the predicted steady‐state wage distribution fits the business sector
wage distribution observed in the CPS. Specifically, equation (16) im-







½δ þ λ1GwðwðpÞÞ 
2 : ð28Þ
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w′ðpÞ¼2λ1φðpÞ






A lognormal distribution is fitted to a sample of wages from the 2006
CPS and then used to construct a sample of firm types using the above
relationship. The sampling distribution Φð Þ that rationalizes this sam-
ple in a steady state (and given values of δ and λ1) is then retrieved
using (28).
Once a sampling distribution has been obtained, the underlying dis-
tributions of firm types γðpÞ and sampling weights qðpÞ are calibrated
on the basis of the employment share/firm size relationship observed
in BED data.




1   e α1GwðwðpÞÞ
1   e α1
 α2
;
with α1 ¼ 8:0661 and α2 ¼ 0:5843. Sampling weights are finally re-
trieved as qðpÞ¼φðpÞ=γðpÞ.
Apart from productivity dispersion, our baseline parameterization is
explicated in table 1. The time unit is 1 month. The value of r ¼ ρ re-
flects an annual discount rate of 5%. The minimum wage is binding (in
the sense that p ¼ w) since, being equal to 5, it exceeds the lower sup-
port of the distribution of potential firm productivity levels, which was
normalized at one (see the next subsection).
B. Simulating an Expansion
In order to simulate the economy’s response to a one‐time, permanent
and unanticipated aggregate productivity shock, we further specify the
model as follows. We assume that any firm’s productivity parameter p
is the product of an aggregate productivity index y (common to all
firms) and a firm‐specific random effect θ. We further assume that there
Table 1
Baseline Parameterization
Parameters (Postshock Monthly Values)
r δλ 0 λ1 wy N 0
.0043 .025 .40 .12 5 1.02 .0509
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 34is an exogenous number N0 of potential firms, each with a fixed value
of θ drawn from some exogenous underlying distribution Γ0ð Þ. Be-
cause for any potential firm productivity is given by p ¼ y   θ, the only
profitable firms in the presence of a wage floor w are those with
θ≥w=y. The distribution of productivity levels among active firms will
thus be given by
ΓðpÞ¼
Γ0ðp=yÞ Γ0ðw=yÞ
1   Γ0ðw=yÞ
; ð29Þ
and the number of active firms will be N ¼ N0½1   Γ0ðw=yÞ . The distri-
bution of potential firm types Γ0ð Þ is then calibrated by shifting the
support of the Γð Þ distribution obtained as explained in the previous
subsection so that its infimum is at p ¼ 1, and we use that as our bench-
mark Γ0ð Þ (given the normalization y ¼ 1). We choose the initial con-
tact rate from unemployment λ0 to generate an initial unemployment
rate of 6.4% and the contact rate from employment λ1 to match a job‐to‐
job quit rate of 2.78% with its theoretical counterpart, which is
30
λ1N




Finally, the number chosen for N0 (see table 1) reflects an average firm
size of 20 employees.
We model a “boom” as a permanent 2% increase in y (from y ¼ 1t o
y ¼ 1:02). We further assume that this productivity increase causes the
job‐finding rate λ0 to increase by 8%
31 and the arrival rate of offers to
employed job seekers, λ1, to increase by 1.6%. If the wage floor w does
not react, the shock causes entry of ΔN ¼ N0½Γ0ðwÞ Γ0ðw=1:02Þ  firms
at the bottom of the productivity distribution, all starting off with a size
of zero. The distribution of productivity across active firms jumps in-
stantly following (29).
C. Results
As can very easily be inferred from equation (8), the response of the
unemployment rate to the positive shock hitting the economy is a sim-
ple monotonic adjustment toward the new (lower) steady‐state value.
The interesting feature of that adjustment is its speed: given our cali-
brated values of δ and λ0, 90% of the distance between the initial and
the final steady state is covered in less than 6 months.
Figure 14 then shows how employment adjusts at single firms: it
shows a plot of LtðpÞ=L0ðpÞ for four different values of p corresponding
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 35to the 50th, 90th, 95th, and 99.9th percentiles of the (postshock) distri-
bution of firm types, Γð Þ.
32 Patterns of employment adjustment differ
markedly across firm types, which translates into differences across
firm size categories since low‐p firms are also smaller firms in the initial
state of the labor market. One sees in figure 14 that “large” firms tend to
increase in size monotonically and gradually (the higher the firm in
terms of p, the more gradual the adjustment). Conversely, “smaller”
firms experience a short episode of rapid growth soon after the shock
and then start shrinking back toward their final steady‐state size, which
they overshoot in the adjustment process. Firms at the 50th percentile of
the Γð Þ distribution (which places them at the 21st percentile of the
sampling distribution Φð Þ and at the 4.5th percentile in terms of steady‐
state cumulated employment shares) even end up being smaller after
the increase in productivity than in the initial steady state.
This pattern conforms with intuition: in the few months following the
shock, most of the new hires are workers coming from unemployment
and get disproportionately allocated to small (low‐p) firms, which are
the majority in sampling terms. After 6 months or so (given the magni-
tude of λ0), the unemployment pool dries up and poaching becomes the
main channel of hiring. Poaching benefits larger, higher‐p, better‐paying
firmsattheexpenseofsmallerones.Itoccurslateronintheexpansionand
is a much slower process than the initial siphoning of the unemployment
Fig. 14. Firm size dynamics
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 36pool since λ1 is about a third of λ0 in magnitude and the average offer ac-
ceptance rate of an employed job seeker is less than one.
For comparison with the descriptive evidence shown in Section II, the
mechanism just described can be depicted in terms of employment
shares and average growth rates by firm size category. This is done
in figures 15, 16, and 17, which parallel figures 2–4 from Section II.
The response of the average job‐to‐job quit rate is plotted in figure 18.
Apart from the initial jump caused by the assumed instant response of λ1
to the productivity shock, the average quit rate has an initial increasing
phase that reflects the initial disproportionate inflow of new hires into
small, low‐productivity firms. These workers start getting poached away
bylargerfirmsrelativelyeasily,whileatthe sametimetheunemployment
pool quickly gets depleted and the excess inflow of workers into easy‐to‐
poachpositionsslowsdown.Asworkersgraduallygetreallocatedtoward
more productive, better‐paying firms, poaching becomes more difficult
(the acceptance rate of outside offers falls) and the quit rate falls.
Finally, figures 19, 20, and 21 plot the dynamic responses of mean
wages, mean output per worker, and the mean labor share, respectively.
The path followed by mean output per worker results from a pure com-
position effect. After the initial upward jump caused by the sudden 2%
increase in the productivity levels of all established firms, mean output
Fig. 15. Firm growth, small vs. large firms
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 37Fig. 16. Employment shares (firms < 20)
Fig. 17. Employment shares (firms ≥ 1,000)per worker adjusts quasi‐monotonically to its higher final steady‐state
value following the gradual reallocation of newly hired workers into
more productive firms. The slight dip observed in the initial phase of
that adjustment is due to the mass of low‐productivity firms suddenly
becoming viable as a result of the positive aggregate shock on y and
Fig. 18. Average job‐to‐job quit rate
Fig. 19. Mean wage
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 39Fig. 20. Mean output per worker
Fig. 21. Mean labor sharethus entering the market with an initial size of zero. These entrant firms
drag average output per worker down in the early phase of the expan-
sion as they hire some workers into low‐productivity jobs.
The mechanisms generating the path followed by the mean wage are
more intricate. First, the same composition effect as for mean output per
worker operates for wages: there is an initial excess inflow of workers
into low‐paying firms, and those workers gradually reallocate them-
selves into better‐paying firms, thereby causing a sluggish positive re-
sponse of the mean wage to the aggregate productivity shock. Note that,
because of this composition effect, the aggregate mean wage would ex-




own. Wages are back‐loaded to the late part of the expansion. The com-
position of these individual dynamic paths causes the initial downward
jump in the mean wage: the effect on the intensive margin, the within‐
firm back‐loading, dominates the aggregate wage at first.
Combining the output and wage series, one can visualize the dy-
namic response of the labor share (fig. 21). This is an interesting plot
to look at, in light of a recent paper by Choi and Ríos‐Rull (2008), who
show that the labor share is countercyclical and persistent. Our model
replicates these facts, in that figure 21 resembles the impulse response
function produced by their vector autoregression analysis: the labor
share decreases on impact of a positive aggregate shock and then grad-
ually increases back toward its new steady‐state value. This, however,
is only a half success, since our model also fails on two important
points. First, Choi and Ríos‐Rull also identify an overshooting property
of the labor share: the labor share impulse response function peaks after
5 years at a higher level than the initial and final steady states.
34
Although the initial dip in average output per worker (see fig. 20)
would in principle help generate this overshooting of the labor share
in our model, it does not seem to be enough.
35 Second, our model pre-
dicts a labor share of 25%–30%, which is about half the number ob-
served in the data. This is related to a fundamental problem of the
Burdett‐Mortensen model, which can replicate only an empirically sen-
sible wage density given a distribution of firm productivity with a very
long right tail, resulting in profit rates close to 100% for a substantial
fraction of highly productive firms (see, e.g., Postel‐Vinay and Robin
[2006] for a discussion of this problem). Modeling explicitly capital
and recruiting costs would certainly reduce profits and raise the labor
share toward plausible values in the calibrated model.
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labor productivity, and the labor share, which keep rising years after
the initial shocks, although the unemployment rate’s half‐life is just a
few months. The main reason is that job‐to‐job transitions in the data
are an order of magnitude slower than the reallocation from unemploy-
ment to employment. Thus, the upgrading process is slow, and so is the
rise in labor productivity after an initial jump following the shock. The
propagation is less pronounced for the EE rate. We are ignoring further
sources of propagation of the unemployment rate, such as endogenous
labor force participation. This is likely to rise in the expansion, feeding
the market with relatively cheap candidates for hiring from unemploy-
ment and delaying the moment when large firms have to start raising
wages aggressively to poach workers, the small firms have to respond
to retain them, and the EE rate peaks. However, our figure 1 shows that
participation seems to play a very minor role at business cycle frequen-
cies. Finally, our quantitative exercise does not feature a strong ampli-
fication of aggregate productivity shocks on unemployment, a subject
of much debate in recent years (Shimer 2005). This is not our main focus,
and at any rate the present exercise is just one initial attempt to gain trac-
tion on the new evidence that we present.
D. Discussion: The Sources of Wage Back‐Loading
Whenworkerscanquittootheremployers,itisalwaysinafirm’sinterest
to back‐load wage payments. In this version of the Burdett‐Mortensen
model, because firms must pay all workers the same, they are not al-
lowed to index wages to individual tenure and to back‐load individual
wages—as they would do in the wage‐tenure models of Burdett and
Coles (2003) and Stevens (2004). However, firms can index contracts to cal-
endartimeandbenefitfromfuturecompetitionfromhigher‐payingfirms.
Specifically, the prospect of receiving an offer from a better‐paying firm
lateron makes upfor the lowwagethat a single firmofferstoday. Inother
words, superior firms impose a “top‐down” externality on inferior firms
throughfuturepoaching,whichencourages the lattertoback‐loadwages.
Promisinghighfuturewagesisadvantageousbecause,withsomechance,
they will be delivered by stronger competitors. Furthermore, a superior
firm’s response to an inferior firm’s back‐loading is to back‐load itself by
offering slightly more at all dates—just enough to maintain its rank and
poach workers away from the lower‐p firm, a reinforcing “bottom‐up”
strategic complementarity. Note that, unlike the former top‐down exter-
nality, the bottom‐up mechanism has no time dimension per se.
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wages.Whenunemploymentdeclinesandtheresultinginflowofcheap
workersintofirmswithit,firmgrowthslowsdown.Atthatpoint,more
productive firms, which have more to lose from not employing work-
ers,finditprofitabletoraisewagestoraidsmaller,lessproductivecom-
petitors. The latter, in turn, respond by raising wages to retain their
workers. This direct impact of unemployment on the level of wages
givesrisetoaback‐loadingincalendartimethatoriginatespurelyfrom
the time‐v a r y i n gs c a r c i t yo fc h e a pj o ba p p l i c a n t s .
Another difference from the wage‐tenure models cited above is that
our contract‐posting model delivers smooth back‐loading despite risk
neutrality, whereas Stevens (2004) shows that the optimal (back‐loaded)
wage‐tenure contract offered to risk‐neutral workers is a step contract
(BurdettandColes[2003]showhowworkerriskaversionentailsgradual
back‐loading). In our case, the gradual nature of back‐loading is purely
driven by strategic considerations.
The extent to which firms can piggyback on their future competitors
dependsontheworkers’(relativetothefirms’)horizon.Mostoftheanal-
ysis so far was based on the assumption that workers and firms were
equally patient and shared a finite discount rate ρ ¼ r. As argued in Sec-
tion IV, however, the model is well defined with different discount rates
for firms and workers, in which case an additional motive for back‐load-
ing comes into play: intertemporal trading. Intuitively, the more patient
the worker relative to the firm, the more back‐loading we should expect.
We address this issue formally in Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay (2008).
VI. Conclusion
We document three new facts about aggregate dynamics in U.S. labor
markets over the last two decades, drawing in part from newly available
data sets. We discover a strong comovement between the share of em-
ployment at large firms, the employer‐to‐employer worker transition
rate, and various measures of wages. All three remain below trend sev-
eral years into the expansion. Then, simultaneously, employment shifts
toward large firms, workers start quitting more from job to job, and
wages accelerate.
While the period under consideration, owing to data availability, is
too short to establish any new stylized facts about business cycles, this
evidence suggests a new view of how labor markets function, or at least
functioned in the last two cycles. More productive firms pay higher
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 43wagesandthushire,employ,andretainmoreworkers.Earlyinanexpan-
sion, when unemployed job applicants are plentiful, all firms exploit their
monopsony power and pay low wages. As few workers are employed, in
particular at small firms, the aggregate job‐to‐job quit rate is small. As the
pool of unemployment dries out, small firms find it increasingly difficult to
keephiring,whereaslargefirmscannowpoachfromsmallfirmstheirlarger
employmentpool.Sotheaggregatequitraterisesandtheshareofemploy-
ment at large firms increases. Aggregate wages rise for two reasons. First,
workersclimbtohigher‐payingfirms,sothereisacompositioneffect.Sec-
ond, firms offer wage profiles that increase over time. The increased com-
petitionforemployedworkerserodesfirms’ monopsony power and leads
to a redistribution of rents from profits to salaries late in an expansion.
We investigate whether this view is consistent with the transitional
dynamicsoftheBurdettandMortensen(1998)equilibriumsearchmodel,
analyzed in a companion paper (Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 2008). In
ourmodel,following apositiveaggregate shocktolabordemand,wages
respondlittleonimpactandstartrisingonlywhenfirmsrunoutofcheap
unemployed hires and start competing to poach and to retain employed
workers.Aggregateshocksarethuspropagatedbythehiringbehaviorof
largefirms.Acalibratedexampleshowsthatthemodelqualitativelycap-
tures the essence of the three facts.
Our analysis presents several limitations. On the empirical side, as
firm productivity is not easily observable, we proxy it by firm size, as
suggestedbythemodel.Firmsizeis,however,endogenousandevolving
over time. Thus, to conclusively establish that the employment share of
small firms peaks at cyclical troughs, we need a panel of employers to
identify those that are small at the end of the recession. So far, we have
made use of publicly available longitudinal information on firms and es-
tablishments. Much work remains to be done to add micro detail and to
extend the analysis back intime, using existing but confidentialresources.
On the theoretical side, in order to focus on the role of aggregate dy-
namicsinthecontract‐postinggame,weabstractfromthepossibilitythat
suchcontractsmaybeconditionedonworkertenure,employmentstatus
of the applicant, or other features. Also we adopted a rather minimal de-
scription of the search technology (exogenous and constant worker‐firm
contact rates), mainly in order to maintain tractability. Next, the thought
experiment is the adjustment to a one‐shot aggregate shock. But ideally
we wouldliketo characterizedynamicsin anexplicitly stochasticmodel,
with aggregate uncertainty recognized by all agents, including down-
turns that we have so far ignored in the analysis. Finally, we are aiming
to obtain a full analytical characterization of the dynamic equilibrium.
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provement. The half‐life of the main time series of interest produced by
the simulation is an order of magnitude shorter than in the data. We
expectthatintroducingpartiallypersistentaggregateshocksand/orre-
laxing some of the theoretical restrictions listed above will fill much of
thisgap.Weplaceexclusivefocusononefriction,jobsearch,asthecom-
mon source of the firm’s boundaries and size, wage dynamics, and
worker flows. It is natural to think about additional frictions that affect
firm size and that operate differentially at different levels of size, such
as borrowing constraints.
Appendix
A Numerical Equilibrium Determination
The algorithm we use to numerically characterize the dynamic equilib-
rium is based on the restriction that, if the minimum wage constraint
binds for some firms, it will do so at early stages of the expansion only.
In other words, any firm can choose to post the minimum wage for a
while right after the productivity shock, but once it ceases to do so, it is
notallowedtoreturnto the minimumwage.Simulations will prove that
an equilibrium with exactly this pattern exists.
In order to construct that equilibrium, we proceed through the fol-
lowing steps.
Step 1. Consider some productivity level p0 such that the functions
πtðp0Þ and μ′ tðp0Þ are known. (In effect the algorithm is started at p0 ¼
p for which those functions are known from [25].) Pick a step size h.
Step 2. Construct a candidate πtðp0 þ hÞ using the second (static) dif-
ferential equation in (23), such as
36











Step 3. Construct a candidate wage path for type ðp0 þ hÞ firms from
~ πtðp0 þ hÞ and equation (12):
~ wtðp0 þ hÞ¼p0 þ h  ½ r þ δ þ λ1Φðp0 þ hÞ ~ πtðp0 þ hÞþπ ~ :
tðp0 þ hÞ:
ðA2Þ
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 45Step 4. Construct wtðp0 þ hÞ and πtðp0 þ hÞ as follows:
• If ~ wtðp0 þ hÞ ≥ w at all dates, set wtðp0 þ hÞ¼~ wtðp0 þ hÞ and πtðp0 þ
hÞ¼~ πtðp0 þ hÞ for all t.
• If ~ wtðp0 þ hÞ < w for t ∈ ½0;t  , set wtðp0 þ hÞ¼~ wtðp0 þ hÞ and πtðp0 þ
hÞ¼~ πtðp0 þ hÞ for all t > t  and set wtðp0 þ hÞ¼w and
πtðp0 þ hÞ¼~ πt ðp0 þ hÞe ½rþδþλ1ΦðpÞ ðt  tÞ
þ
p0 þ h   w
r þ δ þ λ1Φðp0 þ hÞ
f1   e ½rþδþλ1Φðp0þhÞ ðt  tÞg
for t ∈ ½0;t  . (Note that t  may depend on p0.)
Step 5. Use wtðp0 þ hÞ and πtðp0 þ hÞ constructed at step 4 to solve for
μ′ tðp0 þ hÞ in the first equation of (23):
μ′ tðp0 þ hÞ¼
Z þ∞
t
½1 þ λ1γðp0 þ hÞqðp0 þ hÞπtðp0
þ hÞ e ½rþδþλ1Φðp0þhÞ ðs tÞds:
Step 6. Start over at step 1 substituting p0 þ h for p0.
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1. To our knowledge, Shimer (2003) is the only prior attempt to analyze aggregate dy-
namics in a wage‐posting search model. See n. 20 below for a brief description and Robert
Shimer’s discussion of this article in this same volume.
2. Shimer’s unconventional value of 10
5 has been criticized as smoothing too much.
We also tried a more conventional quarterly parameter of 1,600, transformed into a
monthly frequency by multiplying it by 3n for n ¼ 2, 3, or 4. The resulting trends cross
well above and below the actual values repeatedly through NBER‐dated expansions,
suggesting that low‐frequency demographic changes are contaminating (un)employ-
ment fluctuations.
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 463. A moving average (MA) smoother was further applied to the HP‐filtered series. All
infrayearly (i.e., monthly or quarterly) series plotted in this section are MA smoothed for
legibility.
4. Considering standard cutoff sizes to define “small” vs. “large” businesses, we can use
data fromthe County Business Pattern files (see below for a presentation of this data set) to
compare establishments with a workforce in excess of 500 employees with establishments
in the category 1–19 employees. The latter create more jobs (or destroy fewer) around re-
cession years, i.e., 1989–90, 1990–91, less so in 1991–92, and again in 2001–2. In all other
years, 1992–2000 and 2002–4, large establishments create more jobs in total. Details are
available on request. On this subject, see also Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2008).
5. Formoreinformationandtodownloadthedata,visithttp://www.bls.gov/bdm/.David
Talan and Charles Carson from the BLS kindly tabulated for us the firm size distribution
for all available quarters.
6. Visit http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susb.htm and http://www.sba.gov/
advo/research/data.html for more information and data files.
7. These cyclical patterns do not appear to be specific to U.S. firms or establishments.
Although we have not found our new facts spelled out anywhere, disparate pieces of
evidence now fall into place. Delli Gatti et al. (2004) find in a very large sample of Italian
firms that the distribution of employment size becomes less concentrated on large firms
in the aftermath of the 1992 recession and then regains concentration over the ensuing
expansion. This fact is consistent with small firms accounting for a larger share of em-
ployment early in an expansion, since this corresponds to a drop in concentration. Data
from the U.K. Labor Force Survey that we have elaborated (not reported, available on
request) convey information about the share of workers whose workplace has fewer
than 25 employees. Also the U.K. Small Business Administration publishes data on the
shares of U.K. employment in firms with fewer than 20 and more than 249 employees.
Both sources suggest that small U.K. firms lost employment to large ones in expansions,
with sudden reversals in the 1991 and 2002 aggregate slumps, just as in the United States.
On the sensitivity of large employers to recessions, Broersma and Gautier (1997) find in a
panel of Dutch manufacturing firms that large ones restructure their employment mostly
in recessions, whereas small firms do it all the time independently of the cycle. Finally,
Caballero, Engel, and Micco (2004) find in four Latin American countries that large man-
ufacturing plants adjust much more rapidly to shocks, including aggregate ones, than
small plants.
8. On both bottom panels the straight line materializes a linear trend and the shaded
area shows the 95% confidence band around that trend.
9. All are deviations from trend. The trend used for the unemployment rate is the HP‐
filtered series mentioned above, and the trend used for the (much shorter) series of
growth rate differentials is just a linear trend. Note that a very similar‐looking graph ob-
tains when one uses the E/POP ratio instead of the unemployment rate as an indicator of
labor market tightness.
10. Interestingly, it would seem that the growth rate difference is a leading indicator of
the unemployment rate. The correlation between unemployment and the growth rate dif-
ference lagged one quarter is about −0.82.
11. Visit http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/susb.htm for more information and data
files.
12. Details of how we have mapped Standard Industrial Classification and (subse-
quently) North American Industry Classification codes into these eight industries are
available on request.
13. In the NBER Manufacturing Panel from Compustat, with firm sizes fixed in 1975,
the difference in growth rates of employment between firms in the top quartile and firms
below the median has the now familiar pattern throughout 1975–95: falling in recessions
and gradually climbing in expansions. This is true whether we define size in terms of
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 47initial employment, sales, capital, or assets. We thank David Berger for these calculations.
Results are available on request.
14. The critical change in CPS interviewing procedures, which made measurement of
the EE transition rate possible, is the introduction of dependent coding of industries and
occupations. Before asking specific questions about those, starting in 1994 CPS inter-
viewers first read to the survey respondent his or her answers from the previous month
and asked whether anything, including the worker’s employer, had changed. The result-
ing EE transition rate cannot detect unemployment spells that last less than 3 weeks. So,
strictly speaking, it is not a job‐to‐job quit rate. The definition of such a quit rate is, how-
ever, to some extent subjective. The worker may take a voluntary break before starting a
previously lined up new job. Furthermore, Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) also control
for job search activity in the intervening month and find little difference.
15. Information about the SIPP and data files are available at http://www.census.gov/
sipp/.
16. Specifically, it is constructed as the fraction of workers who have changed employ-
ers in the previous year and are now employed at an establishment in size category X
without work interruption among all workers having changed employers in the previous
year and now employed at an establishment in size category X.
17. Although some of the size‐wage gap is explained by workforce composition (which
is obviously ignored in fig. 13), the voluminous literature on this matter establishes that
significant firm size–wage effects remain after one controls for various worker and job
characteristics. Those results are discussed in great detail in Oi and Idson (1999).
18. Sharpe (1994) replicates Gertler and Gilchrist’s findings for employment growth by
initial size defined in terms of net capital. He uses the NBER Manufacturing Panel from
Compustat. As mentioned earlier, in the same data set, now extended by a few years, our
pattern of differential growth rate by initial size still emerges at NBER‐dated business
cycles.
19. The following excerpts from CNNMoney.com reports relate to the perceived 2007–8
turning point in the U.S. labor market: “‘Job seekers now are in the driver’s seat,’ the
Chicago‐based outplacement firm Challenger Gray & Christmas observes. ‘Low unem-
ployment throughout last year forced companies to increase wages and offer new perks
in order to attract and retain the most talented people’” (March 28, 2007). And a year later,
precursory signs of a looming recession are posted by commercial forecasters: “Another
sign from workers that the labor market is getting difficult: There has been a sharp decline
in the number of workers willing to quit their jobs. …‘ When the quit rate is low, it’sa
very bad sign,’ said economist Robert Bruca of FAO Economics” (March 6, 2008). “Joel
Prakken, chairman of Macroeconomic Advisors, which processes the ADP payroll ser-
vices data to produce the report, says what is notable is the decline in employment among
medium size employers, those with 50 to 499 employees” (March 6, 2008).
20. As mentioned in the introduction, Shimer (2003) is the only prior attempt that we
know of to analyze the out‐of‐steady‐state behavior of a search/wage‐posting model. He
considers a dynamic extension of the Burdett‐Mortensen model in which homogeneous
firms can commit to only constant wage profiles also out of steady state, but the firm
must not pay the same wage to all its workers. Because our analysis is motivated as much
by the new evidence that we present as by the model per se, we assume that heteroge-
neous firms post time‐dependent wage contracts.
21. There are various ways to endogenize an increasing sampling density. If each firm
faces a convex cost of posting vacancies, in equilibrium more productive firms will post
more vacancies since they are more profitable, so they will be sampled more often. This
extension also allows one to endogenize the contact rates λ0 and λ1. Alternatively, the
greater visibility of more productive, larger firms attracts more unsolicited job applica-
tions. For example, news of job vacancies may travel by word of mouth; the more em-
ployees work for the same employer, the more of their friends will hear of its open
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay 48positions. Finally, if search has any element of directness, equilibrium mandates that peo-
ple apply more to high‐paying, productive firms to trade off the level of the wage offer
against the chance of getting it.
22. Or, less stringently, we allow firms to index wages to any aggregate variable that
evolves monotonically over time (e.g., the unemployment rate). We thus rule out, among
other things, wage‐tenure contracts (Burdett and Coles 2003; Stevens 2004), offer match-
ing or individual bargaining (Postel‐Vinay and Robin 2002; Dey and Flinn 2005; Cahuc,
Postel‐Vinay, and Robin 2006), or contracts conditioned on employment status (Carrillo‐
Tudela 2007). Note, however, that the model can be generalized to allow for time‐varying
individual heterogeneity under the assumption that firms offer the type of piece rate con-
tracts described in Barlevy (2008). In that sense experience and/or tenure effects can be
introduced into the model. As Robert Shimer clarifies in his discussion of this paper, our
proposed solution to the firm’s problem will also implicitly assume that firms can charge
an initial lump sum to workers at date 0. We refer the reader to Shimer’s discussion for
more on this subtle yet important issue and take this opportunity to thank him for clar-
ifying this point.
23. Incidentally, this implies that the probability density of firm types among workers
at date t is given by NLtðpÞγðpÞ=ð1   utÞ.
24. In formulating (1), we assume for simplicity that any job offer posted in equilibrium
is preferred to unemployment, i.e., infp VtðpÞ ≥ Ut at all t. This is achieved by assuming
that the minimum wage w is sufficiently higher than b for unemployed workers to find
even the least valuable job offer worth accepting.
25. As argued in Moscarini (2005), not responding to outside offers is a sequential equilib-
rium of an ascending (English) auction between the incumbent and the poacher and the
unique equilibrium that survives natural refinements. The more productive of the two firms
winswithoutofferingmorethanitdoestoitsotherworkersbecauseitcanalwaysrespondto
any attempt by the competitor to outbid it, even if the competitor trembles. In this case, our
assumption of no ex post competition is not particularly restrictive. If the auction is instead
simultaneous with either one bid or a sealed bid, as in Bertrand (Postel‐Vinay and Robin
2002), then firms would bid their maximum valuation and our assumption has bite.
26. We thank Pat Kline for pointing this out to us.
27. Note that the following law of motion can also by obtained by integration of (3)
with respect to p. Details are available on request.
28. To see this, notice that (12) and (19) yield two different growth rates for πtðpÞ if all
wages are constant and the economy is off its steady state (so that firm sizes change over
time). Equation (12) gives a πtðpÞ that evolves as an exponential of time. But then with a
constant wage and constant wages offered elsewhere, V′ tðpÞ is constant over time. So di-
viding (19) by LtðpÞ tells us that πtðpÞ is proportional to the gross hiring rate, and so πtðpÞ
cannot beexponentialintime (becausethehiringrate isnot anexponential function of time
in an RPE). All this implies that posting a constant wage in the face of competitors them-
selves posting constant wages violates the firm’s set of necessary optimality conditions.
29. Although the model is silent about the firm/establishment distinction and our evi-
dence is equally valid for either definition, we have to make a choice at this point of the cali-
brationprocedure.InthespiritofBurdettandMortensen,weenvisionafirmasawagepolicy.
















at a steady state, i.e., about 0.23 with our parameterization.
31. This is based on an elasticity of labor market tightness with respect to productivity
of 8 and an elasticity of the job‐finding rate with respect to labor market tightness of 0.5,
both consensual numbers.
Timing of Labor Market Expansions 4932. The normalization by 1=L0ðpÞ is just there to rescale the paths and keep the picture
legible. Moreover, on all figures, circles on the axes indicate initial (steady‐state) values of
the various indicators plotted.
33. This is precisely the situation that would arise under the special assumption of in-
finitely impatient workers (workers with an infinite rate of future discount). The full de-
tails of that special case are in Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay (2008).
34. Incidentally, the final steady‐state labor share is slightly higher than the initial one in
our calibration exercise. This results from the comparative static properties of the Burdett‐
Mortensen model.
35. This could potentially be fixed by “prolonging” the dip in output per worker, which
couldbeachievedbyassumingthattheinitialentryoflow‐productivityfirmsisonlygradual.
36. The following uses a simple Euler approximation. In practice we use a two‐step
Runge‐Kutta approximation for numerical accuracy.
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